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Note
UNITED STATES V. HARVEY: ARE CRIMINAL DEFENSE FEES
MORE VULNERABLE THAN NECESSARY?
In United States v. Harvey' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that Congress may not constitutionally require convicted racketeers and drug traffickers to forfeit property
used to pay legitimate defense attorney fees.' To the extent that
such forfeitures and related pre-conviction restraints on transfer are
authorized by provisions of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
19843 (the Act), those provisions violate an accused's right to counsel of choice as secured by the sixth amendment.4
In so holding, the court repudiated the prevailing view among
district courts that Congress never intended the Act's forfeiture provisions to apply to legitimate attorney fees.' The court also rejected
arguments that the Act violates an accused's basic sixth amendment
1. 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit consolidated three cases for
the purposes of this appeal: United States v. Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8,
1985); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986); and United
States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986). After the three-judge panel issued
its decision, the United States sought and was granted an en banc rehearing in Reckmeyer.
Defendant Harvey was denied a similar petition in his case; no petition for rehearing was
filed in Bassett. The Fourth Circuit sitting en banc reheard Reckmever on October 6, 1987.
No opinion had been issued when this note went to press.
2. Id. at 926.
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. 3, 98 Stat. 1976, 2040 (1984) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1982)). The Act was but one chapter in the
massive Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98
Stat. 1976 (1984), which was the result of years of work by both houses of Congress to
improve and modernize federal criminal laws. In addition to changing the forfeiture
provisions, this statutory overhaul reformed sentencing and bail laws, and amended
drug penalty and insanity defense statutes. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. I3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3184.
The forfeiture provisions have not been the only statutory changes to invite constitutional attack. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II,
ch. 1, 98 Stat.
1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 and scattered other sections of 18 and
28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)), recently withstood fifth and eighth amendment challenges
in United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987). For a critical analysis of the Bail
Reform Act, see Comment, Preventive Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD. L. REV. 378
(1987) (authored by Kevin F. Arthur).
4. 814 F.2d at 926.
5. Id. at 914. Just four days before the Harve"y decision was issued, the United States
District Court in Utah also rejected this statutory interpretation. In United States v.
Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Utah 1987), ChiefJudge Jenkins concluded that the Act's
authors "clearly considered the effect of the bill on a defendant's ability to pay counsel
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right "not to be denied any counsel" 6 or the "discrete right to the
effective assistance of counsel." 7
This note suggests that the court's holding in Harvey was more
narrowly drawn than necessary, and that as a consequence criminal
defense attorney fees now may be more vulnerable to forfeiture.
I.

THE STATUTES

In an effort to "enhance the.., sanction of criminal forfeiture,
as a law enforcement tool in combatting ... racketeering and drug
trafficking," 8 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
in October 1984. The Act substantially strengthens the forfeiture
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)9 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute
(CCE)' ° in order to "strip . . .offenders and organizations of their
economic power. '""
Specifically, the Act expands the definition of property that may
be subject to forfeiture upon conviction to include any real or perof choice" and disagreed among themselves as to how that issue should have been
resolved:
The fact that there is no mention in the Act that attorneys' fees are exempt
from the restraining order can only mean that those who favored no exemption
for attorneys' fees prevailed. The literal language of the statute cannot be read
to create a special category of transfers and thus to exempt attorneys' fees,
whether legitimately paid or not. The only issue Congress left to the courts was
whether or not the provision, as written to encompass attorneys' fees, is
constitutional.
Id. at 1556 (footnote omitted). Judge Jenkins ultimately held that the forfeiture provisions violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice and are thus
unconstitutional as applied to funds or property reasonably necessary to pay attorney
fees. Id. at 1562. While the Harvey opinion makes no reference to Nichols, JudgeJenkins
had the benefit of the briefs submitted by the parties in Harvey. Id. at 1550 n.12.
6. 814 F.2d at 922 (emphasis in original).
7. Id.
8. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as Title IX
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901 (a), 84 Stat. 941
(1970)).
10. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as part of
Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970)).
11. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374. The Senate Report cited a 1981 General Accounting Office
report entitled Asset Forfeiture-A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking to show
the inadequacies of then-existing forfeiture provisions. "This bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement agencies." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3375.
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sonal, tangible or intangible property or interests "constituting, or
derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or
indirectly" from racketeering or drug trafficking.' 2 Under the Act's
"relation back" provision, the government's interest in property
subject to forfeiture now arises when the charged offense is committed, rather than upon conviction.'" The government is authorized
to protect that interest through pre- or post-indictment restraining
orders or injunctions prohibiting property transfers.' 4
Third parties claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture are precluded from intervening in the trial or appeal, or from
5
challenging in a separate action the government's interest.,
Although the Act does provide an opportunity for third-party claimants to petition the court for post-conviction proceedings to adjudicate the validity of their claims,' 6 Congress recognized only two
justifications for exempting property from forfeiture. First, property is not subject to forfeiture if a third party demonstrates an interest superior to that of the defendant at the time of the crime.' 7
Second, no property may be seized from a bona fide purchaser for
value who, at the time of purchase, was reasonably without cause to
believe the property was subject to forfeiture. 8
Although attorney fees are not explicitly mentioned in the
Act,' 9 there seems to be no dispute that an attorney's paid representation would constitute a bona fide purchase for value 2 ' but for the
attorney's special and necessary knowledge of both the forfeiture
law and the sources of the client's property.2 ' It is precisely this
dilemma that gives rise to the controversy and the constitutional implications in the forfeiture cases. In each of the three cases consolidated for purposes of appeal in Harvey, the government invoked the
forfeiture provisions in ways that could have prevented defendants
from paying legitimate attorney fees, or prevented defense counsel
from retaining fees already paid.22

1963(a)-(b), 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1985).
1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985).
1963(e), 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (Supp. III 1985).
1963(j), 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (Supp. III 1985).
1963(m), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Supp. III 1985).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

18
18
18
18
18

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (Supp. I1 1985).
18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
814 F.2d at 913.
Id. at 914-15 n.4.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 910.

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§
§

19871

UNITED STATES V. HARVEY

II.

325

THE CASES

In United States v. Reckmeyer 23 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia granted defense counsel's thirdparty petition to modify a post-conviction forfeiture order to permit
the payment of attorney fees. Defendant Reckmeyer's assets had
been frozen by a restraining order issued one day before his indictment under the CCE statute. Money to cover legal expenses incurred through indictment was placed in escrow. Upon conviction,
a forfeiture order was entered encompassing virtually all of the assets that could have been used to pay attorney fees.2 4
The court directed the government to pay defense counsel out
of forfeited assets on the ground that Congress did not intend the
forfeiture provisions to include legitimate attorney fees, but only
those fees that were "illusory and fraudulent transfers" designed
solely to avoid forfeiture.2 5 The court's conclusion was predicated
on the Act's legislative history and was further supported by the
court's concern that a contrary interpretation would violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice.2 6
In United States v. Bassett 2 the United States. District Court for
the District of Maryland granted a motion by defendants in a heroin
trafficking case to exempt their attorney fees from forfeiture under
the provisions of the CCE statute. The prosecutor had advised
counsel by letter after the indictment was returned that the government would seek forfeiture of the fees upon conviction. 28 The court
arrived at essentially the same conclusion, and for essentially the
same reasons, as had the Reckmeyer court just days earlier.2 9
The government's appeals from these two decisions were consolidated by the court of appeals with the appeal of defendant Har23. 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
24. Id. at 1193.
25. Id. at 1196.
26. Id. at 1195-96.
27. 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986), aff dsub norn. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d
905 (4th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 1309.
29. Id. at 1317. The Harvey court distinguished the Bassett and Reckmever decisions:
Unlike the court in Bassett, which found that the Government could not reach
assets held by anyI third parties unless the transfer was a sham or otherwise
fraudulent, the district court [in Reckmeyerl found only that Congress did not
intend for bonafide attorneys fees to be subject to forfeiture under the CCE.
814 F.2d at 912. Even if there is some basis in the district court decisions for drawing
this distinction, it is a distinction without a difference. Both cases dealt only with legitimate attorney fees; no other third-party transfers were at issue.
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vey from his 1985 conviction under both RICO and CCE statutes. 30
Harvey contended, inter alia, that the trial court's refusal to exempt
attorney fees from forfeiture violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel of choice.3
The court of appeals affirmed the exemption of attorney fees
from forfeiture in both Bassett and Reckmeyer, although on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. 2 The court declined to reverse Harvey's conviction, however, despite the validity of his
constitutional challenge, for reasons relating to the particular facts
of his trial. 3
III.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Before reaching the sixth amendment question, the court of appeals explicitly rejected the notion that Congress intended to exempt legitimate attorney fees from the reach of the Act's forfeiture
provisions. 3 4 The court found the language of the Act so clear, and
30. United States v. Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 1985), aff'd, 814
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
31. 814 F.2d at 913. Harvey also argued that a pre-conviction restraining order
prohibiting use of his assets to retain counsel of his choice violated his procedural due
process rights under the fifth amendment. The court of appeals agreed, but it found
that the violation implicated only the deprivation of property that Harvey suffered in the
absence of an "adequate post-deprivation hearing within a meaningful time." Id. at 931.
Consequently, reversal of Harvey's conviction would not be an appropriate remedy, the
court said, adding that the subsequent jury determination of forfeitability rendered entry of the restraining order harmless error. Harvey would not be entitled to vacation of
the order as long as the conviction and accompanying order of forfeiture stood. The
court declined to consider whether Harvey might be entitled to a civil remedy for the
temporary violation of his due process rights. Id. This note will not discuss the procedural due process question.
32. Id. at 929-30.
33. Id. at 930. After issuing a restraining order barring Harvey from using any of his
property until the conclusion of trial and all appeals, and refusing to exempt attorney
fees from that order, the trial court appointed substantially the same defense team as
Harvey had retained before the order. The court of appeals found denial of counsel of
choice "at least arguable" under these circumstances. Id. Recognizing, however, that
Harvey might not have received the same legal service he would have received without
the restraining order, the court affirmed the conviction without prejudice to Harvey's
right to challenge the conviction on constitutional grounds in collateral proceedings.
Such proceedings, the court said, would provide the proper context for deciding
whether the reduced fees and support resources allowed under the appointment order
significantly diminished the effectiveness of counsel. Id. at 930-31. The trial court had
denied most of defense counsel's motions to increase the number of attorneys appointed and to retain various experts with public funds. As a result, the defense argued
that its "preparation for trial bore no resemblance to the preparation that normally
would and should, but could not, be undertaken prior to a trial of this magnitude." Id.
at 912.
34. Id. at 913.
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so plainly to the contrary, as to preclude any resort to legislative
history for guidance in statutory interpretation. 5
Acknowledging that most of the district courts addressing the
issue believed otherwise, 6 the court undertook its own survey of the
legislative history. While agreeing with Bassett and Reckmeyer that
Congress primarily intended the Act to preclude "sham and fraudulent transfers," ' 3 7 the court found nothing that would justify limiting
the scope of the forfeiture provisions to such transactions. Quite
the contrary, the court found a "clear congressional intent to make
voidable a wider range of asset transfers."3 8
Finally, the court refused to find that merely raising serious
constitutional questions justified a "saving" interpretation of the
Act by the courts.3 " Although courts are bound to interpret ambiguous statutes in a way most consistent with constitutionality, the
court found no ambiguity here.4 °
IV.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The court then turned to the sixth amendment questions raised
4
parties and the various district courts: '
the
by
First and, in light of the court's ultimate decision, foremost, is
the defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice violated by orders that restrain transfer of legitimate attorney fees or by the threat
35. Id.
36. Id. at 913 n.3. The court cited United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.
Wis. 1986); United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1986); United States
v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.
Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressly disagreeing with Payden, cited infra, from the same
district); and United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985). The court
cited as contrary authority United States v. Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8,
1985) (affirmed on this appeal); and In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
January 2, 1985 (Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressly disagreeing with
Rogers analysis).
37. 814 F.2d at 916.
38. Id. at 917.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 918.
41. Id. at 918-19. The court also considered the substantive due process right to a
fundamentally fair trial under the fifth amendment, but treated it as so closely related to
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel as to present no truly separate issue. Id. at 922. As Justice O'Connor explained:
The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it
defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions
of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984).
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of ultimate forfeiture, because private attorneys will decline such
42
cases without some assurance that they will be paid?
Next, is the basic sixth amendment right to counsel jeopardized
if the potential for forfeiture renders a defendant unable to retain
private counsel, yet not so indigent as to qualify for a court43
appointed attorney?

Finally, even when private counsel is retained, is a defendant's
right to the effective assistance of counsel threatened by conditioning the attorney's payment upon ignorance of the source of the cli44
ent's assets or their potential forfeitability?
The court answered the last of these questions with a single
45
paragraph endorsing the position of the government and others
that the effectiveness of counsel, and the corresponding fifth
amendment right to a fundamentally fair trial, could only be determined after conviction, precluding any earlier constitutional challenge to the Act. 46 The court gave the second question equally
short shrift by suggesting that a defendant's inability to obtain any
counsel at all simply could not arise absent judicial abuse.4 7 Only
42. 814 F.2d at 921. The court cited Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), as
exemplary authority for the right to counsel of choice. In Powell, the notorious "Scottsboro Boys" case, seven black defendants were convicted in Scottsboro, Alabama, of raping two white girls on a train. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction
on the ground that the trial court's failure to give the defendants "reasonable time and
opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process." Id. at 71. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Sutherland asserted that the opportunity to which a defendant
is entitled is a "fair opportunity to secure counsel of his choice." Id. at 53.
Since Powell the right to counsel of choice has been refined primarily by decisions
explaining just how fair that "fair opportunity" must be. Many such decisions have involved the denial of counsel of choice when exercise of that right would require a continuance. See, e.g., Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 211 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Every person
has a constitutional right to retain at his own expense his own counsel so long as that
right does not unreasonably interfere with the normal progress of a criminal case.");
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) ("While the right to select a
particular person as counsel is not an absolute right, the arbitrary dismissal of a defendant's attorney of choice violates a defendant's right to counsel.").
43. 814 F.2d at 921 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938), for the
"minimal or basic" sixth amendment right to counsel). Among the district court forfeiture decisions, snpra note 36, the court singled out United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.
Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), as raising this question in particular.
44. 814 F.2d at 921 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
45. See Brickey, Forfeitureof Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Folfeitures on the
Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 529-32 (1986) (no sixth amendment right litigable
before conviction).
46. 814 F.2d at 922.
47. Id. The court found the "worst possible effect" of the Act's application would
only be to force indigence upon the defendant, creating a right to appointed counsel.
Only a "follow-up refusal to appoint any counsel" would violate the "minimal" sixth
amendment right. Id.
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the defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice was found to be
implicated by the forfeiture provisions.4 8
To reach this conclusion, the court asserted that the framers of
the Constitution envisioned representation by private attorneys as
the primary right secured by the sixth amendment against government encroachment.4 9 It would therefore be patently unconstitutional for Congress to legislate direct restrictions on a defendant's
selection of an attorney or on the amount of money that counsel
could be paid. If Congress is forbidden to do so directly, the court
reasoned, then it may not do so indirectly through unlimited freeze
orders and the threat of forfeiture. 0
Acknowledging that the right to counsel of choice may be limited by countervailing governmental interests, 5 the court nevertheless reached the same conclusion by balancing individual against
governmental interests in the context of criminal forfeiture. Because the right to counsel was created to protect the guilty as well as
the innocent, the court argued, it must have been created with the
certain knowledge that ill-gotten gains would be used to exercise
it.5" Therefore, the government's interest in deterrence, in preserving its property, and in stripping racketeers of their economic base
must yield to the defendant's interest in using assets to retain counsel, even if those assets are tainted by crime. 3
V.

ANALYSIS

To be sure, the Harvey decision substitutes a clear constitutional
mandate for a rather strained statutory interpretation as the justification for courts' exempting legitimate attorney fees from RICO
48. Id. at 922-23. The court suggested that the government, the defendants, and the
parties all found the right to counsel of choice to be the sixth amendment component
"most seriously drawn in issue by the forfeiture of attorneys' fees." See id.
49. Id. at 923. The court cited Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), in
which the Sixth Circuit had declared:
The right to choose one's own counsel is an essential component of the
Sixth Amendment because, were a defendant not provided the opportunity to
select his own counsel at his own expense, substantial risk would arise that the
basic trust between counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary
system, would be undercut.
50. 814 F.2d at 924.
51. Id. judge Phillips cited his own opinion in Sampley v. Attorney General, 786
F.2d 610, 613 (4th Cir. 1986), in which he had stated, "The limit of the right [to counsel
of choice] is necessarily found in the countervailing [governmental] interest against
which the sixth amendment right provides explicit protection: the interest in proceeding with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis.
52. 814 F.2d at 924-25.
53. Id. at 925.
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and CCE forfeiture provisions. 5 4 Nevertheless, one is left with the
uneasy feeling that the exemption is on a less secure footing than it
might have been.5 5
54. The court's rejection of the prevailing view that the Act's forfeiture provisions
were never meant to touch legitimate attorney fees is quite compelling, whether the
analysis is by rules of statutory construction or by recourse to legislative history. In the
latter vein, the court might have added that the Act's authors cited with apparent approval United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981), in describing the "relation
back" mechanism of the Act. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 n.28, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3383 n.28. The Long court, in a preamendment recognition of the same underlying policy, held that property derived from
a violation of CCE remained subject to criminal forfeiture although transferred to the
defendant's attorneys before conviction, and that an order restraining the attorneys
from transferring or selling the property was properly entered.
Other courts looking back at Long dismissed it as inapplicable here on the ground
that the transaction between Long and his lawyers appeared to have been in the nature
of a "sham transfer." United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (D. Md. 1986);
see also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985). These courts
miss the point. The note about Long in the Senate Report makes no allegation of sham
or fraudulent transfer. For the purpose of illustrating the principle involved, it apparently made no difference to the Act's authors whether the transfer was legitimate or
otherwise. Had they intended to treat the two cases differently, the distinction would
surely have been raised.
55. In part, this uneasiness must derive from the court's convincing demolition of
the prevailing statutory interpretation. The court itself made the point that there is
comfort in the notion that Congress could not have intended to do something that
seems utterly contrary to our adversary system. 814 F.2d at 914-15. Perhaps, in its
quest for a constitutional holding the court abandoned statutory interpretation prematurely, giving Congress less credit than it merited.
The greater cause of this discomfort may be the court's exclusion of all save one
rather frail component of the sixth amendment right to counsel upon which to base the
exemption of legitimate attorney fees. The United States Supreme Court just might
accept the entire Harvey rationale, but then find that the government's interest in depriving racketeers and drug traffickers of their booty simply outweighs a right to counsel of
choice that may be exercised only by those who can afford it and is, itself, riddled with
exceptions and exclusions. For a discussion of the limitations on the sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice, see infra note 67.
In Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1982), for example, the Court clearly demonstrated
its hostility to any expansion of the right to counsel of choice. In the majority opinion,
Justice White concededly went far out of his way to reject what he saw as a "novel Sixth
Amendment right" to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship" asserted by the Ninth
Circuit tojustify reversal of a conviction following denial of a continuance. Id. at 13-14.
In so doing, he appeared to "balance" the defendant's interest against "the interest of
the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case."
Id.
Notwithstanding this language, the "relationship" test urged by the Ninth Circuit
arguably was not a new right at all, but merely a factor to be weighed in balancing the
defendant's right to counsel of choice against the government's interest in the orderly
administration of justice. Id. at 16-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). Seen in
that light, Justice White's rejection of the doctrine can be fairly viewed as supporting the
proposition that the Harvey decision is vulnerable to reversal on the facts even if the
legal logic were found acceptable.
The Harvey court correctly determined, under Brennan's analysis, that the right to
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The remaining sections of this note will discuss how the exemption of legitimate attorney fees from forfeiture might have been
placed on a broader, stronger foundation by affirming that the statutory language itself provides some latitude for judicial exemptions,
and by finding a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel
presumptively violated without an exemption.
A.

Latitudefor Judicial Exemptions from Forfeiture

The Fourth Circuit held that the literal import of the Act "contemplates the forfeiture of attorney fees in any circumstances where
the attorney cannot establish that he was 'without reasonable cause
to believe that the property [used to pay the fees] was subject to
forfeiture.' "56 But the decision offered no support for such a
sweeping pronouncement beyond those arguments that directly refute the equally sweeping, and diametrically opposite, pronouncements of the Bassett and Reckmeyer courts.
On close examination of the statutory language, particularly as
interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Thier,5 7 judicial exemption of legitimate attorney fees appears to be justifiable on grounds that need not rise to
the level of constitutional rights. By affirming the Bassett decision on
these narrower grounds, the Fourth Circuit might have preserved
the possibility of such exemptions against a constitutional reversal
by the United States Supreme Court.
While the statute clearly mandates forfeiture of covered property upon conviction, it uses the permissive "may" to give trial
courts discretion as to the pre-conviction restraints on property
transfers that may be imposed at the government's request.5 8 These
provisions explicitly limit the availability to the government of preconviction restraints,5 9 but place no limitations whatsoever on the
discretion of the courts to deny, wholly or partially, the government's application. Nor does the statute discuss what criteria a trial
court must use in making that decision.
Accordingly, the Thier court referred to traditional criteria for
counsel of choice was violated. Given the inconclusive quality of this right, however, the
court should not have been so quick to dismiss the other components of the sixth
amendment right to counsel which may also have been implicated.
56. 814 F.2d at 918.
57. 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987). See also United
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (D. Colo. 1985).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e), 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (Supp. III 1985).
59. See id.
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issuing preliminary injunctions, which require, inter alia, a showing
that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs must outweigh the harm
the injunction might do the defendants. 6" In this context, the Thier
court said, the trial court must weigh the "possible adverse effects of
a pretrial refusal to exempt defense counsel's fee from forfeiture"
against the government's interest in protecting potentially forfeitable property. 6 '
The Thier court denied that such balancing compels any particular result; 62 hence, exemption cannot be considered a constitutional
mandate. But the holding necessarily implies that the trial court has
statutory authority to exempt legitimate attorney fees from preconviction restraint. 6 ' Any such exemption would be of little practical significance if those fees were then subject to forfeiture on conviction, so the exemption ought permanently to negate any
government interest.
In Bassett there was no government motion for a pre-conviction
restraining order, but the opportunity for the trial court to exercise
its discretion arose with the government's pretrial notice to defense
counsel of intent to seek forfeiture of attorney fees upon conviction.
Both devices have precisely the same adverse effect on the attorneys' opportunity to receive legitimate payment under the thirdparty claims provisions of RICO and CCE. 64 It follows that defend60. 801 F.2d at 1470.
61. Id. at 1474.
62. Id. In fact, Thier was decided solely on the ground that the trial court's refusal to
grant the defendant any hearing at all before issuing a forfeiture order violated his fifth
amendment right to procedural due process.
63. This may be the true import of the passage in the legislative history suggesting
that no provision of the Act relating to pretrial restraining orders "is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. I at 19 n.l (1984). As long as trial courts have the discretion to exempt
legitimate attorney fees from forfeiture, sixth amendment rights are not necessarily at
risk. The passage continues: "The [House Judiciary] Committee, therefore, does not
resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal case." Id. Unless one reads the
second sentence as a willful abdication of the legislative responsibility to enact only constitutional laws, it must mean that the Act's authors saw no need to resolve the conflict
because courts could readily avoid the problem. See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1343 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding intent by Congress to permit trial courts to
exercise discretion).
64. The government essentially concedes this point. See Justice Department Guidelines
on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, 38 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter
Justice Guidelines]. These guidelines make it somewhat more difficult for prosecutors to
seize attorney fees by requiring actual knowledge by the attorney of the susceptibility of
those fees to forfeiture.
Under these guidelines.., the only assets which an attorney conclusively would
be held to have actual knowledge of forfeitability are those specifically named
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ant Bassett should be entitled to the same judicial consideration that
the statute affords to defendant Thier.
Although the Bassett court never explicitly conducted the balancing suggested in Thier, its decision leaves no room for doubt that
it would find Bassett's interests to outweigh the government's. 65
The Harvey court thus could have affirmed Bassett on the ground that
the trial court was merely exercising its statutory discretion. 6 6
B.

Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

The exemption from forfeiture of legitimate attorney fees
would be on much stronger constitutional grounds if the Harvey
court had not so quickly dismissed the "effective assistance of counsel" component of the sixth amendment right.6 7 Ironically, the
in the indictment or subject to a restraining order or civil forfeiture proceeding.... [T]he Department believes it is inappropriate to give written notice to
an attorney that a particular asset or that all assets belonging to a defendant are
from an illegitimate source or subject to forfeiture simply to meet the requirement of actual knowledge imposed by these guidelines.
Sending written notice of the forfeitability of assets that are not specifically
described or under restraint no doubt would be attacked as impermissibly interfering with the qualified right to counsel of choice. The argument could be
made that if the notice is not based upon a probable cause determination that
the assets are subject to forfeiture, it was sent only to harass the attorney or
cause him to abandon the case and not because the asset is legitimately subject
to forfeiture.
Id. at 3006.
65. Although the Bassett holding is based on a statutory interpretation, the court asserts that a contrary ruling would violate Bassett's constitutional rights. 632 F. Supp. at
1317-18. Thus, any balancing would pit a constitutional right against mere legislative
policy.
66. Such a holding could be expanded, perhaps, to establish the availability under
the statute of a discretionary exemption whenever the forfeiture of legitimate attorney
fees is clearly threatened by any governmental action, including the indictment itself,
that would automatically disqualify counsel from mounting a successful third-party
claim. Thier, 801 F.2d at 1474 ("[T]he defense attorney's necessary knowledge of the
charges against his client cannot defeat his interest in receiving payment out of the defendant's forfeited assets for legitimate legal services."). While the remedy still falls
short of the blanket exemption from forfeiture that a constitutional holding would provide, it might survive a possible reversal of the Hanley court's sixth amendment
interpretation.
67. It is instructive to review, though unnecessary to dispute, the Harvey court's analysis of the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice in order to appreciate the fragility
of the court's constitutional holding. The court concedes that the right is qualified by
the government's countervailing interest in the orderly administration ofjustice, that it
contemplates only the "fair opportunity" to choose one's counsel, and that it does not
embrace any guarantee of a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." 814 F.2d at 92324 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 1314 (1983)). The court also acknowledges that the right may be lost to an accused in
several ways-among them, in rem forfeitures and jeopardy tax assessments-without
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starting point for holding that the Act violates a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel can be found within Harvey itself.
Conceding that specific applications of the Act could result in
effectiveness violations, the Fourth Circuit insisted that such violations could only be determined after conviction.6 8 The "mere possibility" of violation could not subject the Act to constitutional
challenge before conviction.6 9 Rather, such a challenge should be
pursued in a collateral proceeding to determine whether counsel
was actually ineffective and whether actual prejudice occurred under
the test of Strickland v. Washington.70
Strickland does indeed provide the appropriate test for actual
and prejudicial ineffectiveness of counsel. 7' But the Strickland Court
went to some lengths to distinguish the facts of that case from
others in which the ineffectiveness claim was "based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to
the accused." 7 2 In such cases "the surrounding circumstances
necessarily violating sixth amendment rights. Id. at 925-26. While the court distinguishes the criminal forfeitures at issue here, the distinctions in no way defeat the
analogy.
68. 814 F.2d at 922.
69. Id. (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 71
(1961), for the proposition that "[mierely potential impairment of constitutional rights
under a statute does not of itself create ajusticiable controversy in which the nature and
extent of those rights may be litigated.").
70. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
71. See id. at 687. The Strickland Court set forth a two-part test:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as
to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Id. The Court went on to clarify the relationship between the two prongs of the test:
"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
at 694. Furthermore, the Court stressed that, although it had set forth the two components of the test in a particular order, "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing of one." Id. at
697.
72. Id. at 683 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). In Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, the United States Supreme Court rejected a formulaic
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[make] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed without inquiry into
73
actual performance at trial."
The Harvey court simply failed to consider the possibility that
the conflict of interest between counsel and client established by the
forfeiture provisions of the Act, particularly the "ignorance of forfeitability" test under the bona fide purchaser exception, could create precisely the kind of circumstances referred to in Strickland. If it
does, there is no need to inquire into counsel's actual performance,
no need to await conviction, and no need to attack collaterally.
Even the strongest supporters of the forfeiture provisions as applied to attorney fees concede there might well be a conflict of interest between attorney and accused.74 Counsel might be tempted to
plead a client guilty to a lesser offense not punishable by forfeiture,
or reject a plea bargain that includes forfeiture, even though such
action is contrary to the client's best interest. Although supporters
have suggested various mechanisms by which such conflicts may be
mitigated, 75 the conflict itself is inherent in the statute.
approach developed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for
determining the effectiveness of counsel by inference from the surrounding circumstances, without reference to errors made at trial. Significantly, however, the Cronic
Court reaffirmed the proposition that circumstances could be present in which,
"although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the
trial." 466 U.S. at 659-60.
73. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661. Justice Brennan, who quoted this sentence from Cronic in
his opinion in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), had earlier characterized this class of cases as involving an impermissible interference with the discharge of a defense counsel's "normal functions." Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 26 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan sought to distinguish between
impermissible interference and ineffective assistance as two varieties of sixth amendment violations. Only for the latter would a showing of prejudice have to be made at
trial.
It now appears that Brennan's rather strained efforts were unnecessary. Several of
the cases cited by Brennan to support his argument in lornis were noted byJustice Stevens in his majority opinion in Cronic as illustrative of "presumed ineffectiveness." See
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 & n.28 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)
(court's failure to appoint separate counsel forjointly represented codefendants); Glasser v.United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (court's appointment of one defendant's counsel
as codefendant's attorney); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (court's ineffective
appointment of counsel)). Thus, "ineffective assistance" may either be demonstrated at
trial or presumed from surrounding circumstances.
74. See Brickey, supra note 45, at 534.
75. Id. at 536-38 (suggesting adherence to theJustice Guidelines, as discussed at supra
note 64). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985
(Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849-50 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (suggesting either a bifurcation
of trial or use of civil forfeiture provisions).
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The United States Supreme Court has already held that a conflict of interest can be sufficient grounds for finding ineffective
assistance of counsel if the conflict has adversely affected counsel's
performance. 7 6 The Court has also held that the government necessarily violates the right to effective assistance of counsel when it interferes with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions
about how to conduct the defense.7 7 In the conflict created by the
prospect of forfeiture, counsel is forced to make decisions as to the
conduct of the defense in an environment colored by a competing
interest. When, as in this case, the government has caused the conflict to occur, the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance must be presumed without inquiry into actual performance.
The Harvey court might have used such an argument, in addition to the counsel of choice theory, to affirm the Reckmeyer order.
Reckmeyer pleaded guilty to violations of drug trafficking and federal tax laws, yet even so incurred legal fees of $170,512.78 Had
Reckmeyer stood trial on those counts, his legal fees-and the costs
incurred by his counsel-presumably would have been far greater.
With all of Reckmeyer's assets at risk of forfeiture, his attorneys
clearly had an interest in limiting their exposure to loss. Surely such
a conflict is constitutionally impermissible without any need to inquire as to whether counsel's representation of Reckmeyer was actually affected.7 9

76. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50
(1980)). Cuyler is one of a line of conflict-of-interest cases involving defense counsel's
representation of multiple clients whose interests do not coincide. Its direct antecedents
are Glasser and Hollowav, cited supra note 73. Cuyler held that "[i]n order to establish a
violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate [to a reviewing court] that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 446 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added). But Cuyler did not disturb the
holding in Glasser that a trial court's failure to remedy an actual conflict of interest,
timely brought to its attention, constitutes a violation of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel without reference to the lawyer's conduct of the trial or prejudice to the defendant, 315 U.S. at 75.
77. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344. The Court cited Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80
(1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (requirement that defendant be first witness); and Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593-96 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant).
78. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub
nor. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
79. It is at least arguable that the Harvey court did indeed find a violation of the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, but felt compelled to mislabel it,
presumably to preserve the "tradition" of declining to hear such challenges on direct
appeal. 814 F.2d at 930. Indeed, the court seems so bound to the doctrine that ineffec-
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The Harvey decision discarded a clearly strained statutory interpretation as the basis for exempting legitimate attorney fees from
forfeiture under RICO and CCE statutes. Instead, the court predicated such exemptions exclusively on the qualified right to counsel
of choice under the sixth amendment. In so doing, the court left the
exemptions unnecessarily vulnerable.
A stronger constitutional argument for exempting attorney fees
could have been made in the Harvey cases by relying additionally on
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Moreover, there is ample justification for a statutory interpretation giving
trial courts the discretion to exempt attorney fees from forfeiture
before conviction. Either approach would have better protected the
integrity of our adversarial process from the wholly unnecessary and
unwarranted accretion of prosecutorial advantage represented by
the actual or even threatened forfeiture of legitimate attorney fees.
ERIC B.

EASTON

tiveness can only be attacked after conviction that it bends over backwards to link obvious effectiveness questions to the issue of counsel of choice.
For example, the court explicitly finds that the Act jeopardizes the individual's
interest in having effectively armed private counsel, which means at the very
minimum counsel sufficiently informed to mount an effective defense or otherwise provide effective assistance. This necessary assumption of the adversarial
system . . . is also effectively undercut-practically emasculated-by provisions
of the Act which make counsel's very ability to retain legitimately contracted
fees dependent upon his not being fully informed.
Id. at 925. But then, without further explanation, the court states: "This, it must be
emphasized, goes not to the right to effective assistance of counsel, but to the primary
right to representation by privately retained counsel of choice." Id.

